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LANDLORD AND TENANT
THE CONDITION OF THE PREMISES
WALTER L.

SCHLEGEL, JR.*

F

EW fields of law are of more interest to the average
practitioner and few have been more neglected in recent
legal publications than that dealing with the duty of the landlord and the tenant to repair the demised premises and the
lessor's property adjacent to the demised premises. It is the
purpose of this paper to treat this field with special emphasis
on the law of Illinois. However, it is believed that the principles enunciated are of general significance and are applicable to the common law of all states where that system
prevails, except where it is indicated that Illinois law is peculiar in some respect. Some emphasis will be placed upon the
effect of the lease contract with respect to the duty to repair, in view of the fact that leases frequently contain provisions relating thereto. For the purposes of this paper, unless otherwise indicated, any duty with respect to the physical condition of the premises-for example an obligation to
mend defects, to erect improvements, or to heat-will be regarded as a duty to "repair," inasmuch as it is believed that
similar principles are applicable to any such obligation.
The landlord owes a duty to keep in a reasonably safe condition the portions of the premises in his possession and control. This duty does not arise as a result of his status as
landlord but from the fact that he, as any person, must so
control his property as not to unreasonably endanger oth* Member of Illinois Bar; alumnus of Chicago-Kent College of Law; Ass't to
Orrin Garner, Patent Attorney, American Steel Foundries.
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ers. 1 Thus, if his title is limited so that he has no right to
control the premises, there is no duty.- And again, if he
transfers his possession, he is no longer charged with the
responsibility of maintaining the property in good condition, 3 although he may, under certain circumstances, becondition which accrued during
come liable for a dangerous
4
possession.
his
the time of
Passageways provided for the common use of the various
tenants of a building are under the control of the landlord,
in the absence of some evidence that this was not intended
by the parties to the lease.5 In order that such passageway
be a common one it is necessary that more than one tenant
have access to it; Ghowever, a way, common at its inception,
since it leads to the premises of several of the tenants, is
under the control of the landlord as to its entire length, unless some evidence can be produced to show that the parties
intended otherwise, despite the fact that a portion of the
passage leads only to the premises of one tenant. 7 Thus common stairways, s porches,9 sidewalks, ° and elevators 1
1 Bodden v. Thomas, 192 Ill. App. 348 (Abst., 1915); Payne v. Irvin, 144 Ill. 482,
33 N.E. 756 (1893); Revel v. Butler, 322 Ill. 337, 153 N.E. 682 (1926); Rogowski v.
Picha, 182 Ill. App. 378 (Abst., 1913). See also Baird v. Shipman, 132 Ill. 16, 23
N.E. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 504, 7 L. R. A. 128 (1890).
2 Brazowski v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 280 Ill. App. 293 (1935), noted in 13
CHICAGO-KENT REmVw 383. See also Bodden v. Thomas, 192 Ill. App. 348 (Abst.,
1915).
3 Hull v. Sherrod, 97 Ill. App. 298 (1901); Wheeler v. Pullman Palace Car Co.,
131 Il. App. 262 (1907); Revel v. Butler, 322 Ill. 337, 153 N.E. 682 (1926); Blake v.
Ranous, 25 Ill. App. 486 (1888); Park v. Penn, 203 Ill. App. 188 (Abst., 1916);
Johnson v. Perkins, 167 M11.App. 611 (1912); Gathemann v. Rosenfeld, 190 Ill.
App. 110 (Abst., 1914).
4 See notes 135-141 infra.
5 Wells v. Wise, 298 Ill. App. 252, 18 N.E. (2d) 750 (1939), where the court discusses the evidence in order to show that the parties intended a stairway to be a
common one.
6 Platt v. Farney, 16 Ill. App. 216 (1885); May v. DiCenso, 277 Ill. App. 248
(1934); Pamler v. Byrd, 131 Ill. App. 495 (1907).
7 Wells v. Wise, 298 Il. App. 252, 18 N.E. (2d) 750 (1939).
But see, contra,
Henry v. Breyer, 151 Ill. App. 566 (1909) with a strong dissent.
8 Rosseu v. Goodridge, 185 Ill. App. 164 (Abst., 1914); Miller v. Spreyne, 189
Ill. App. 384 (1914); B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N.E. 354, 3 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1097 (1905).
9 Bayofski v. Rosenberg, 194 11. App. 609 (Abst., 1915); Petterson v. Gnatek, 205
Ill. App. 309 (1917).
10 Udwin v. Spirkel, 136 Ill. App. 155 (1907); Christiansen v. Navigato, 185 Ill.
App. 318 (1914); Sprengel v. Schroeder, 203 Ill. App. 213 (Abst., 1917).
11 Hill v. Western Union Cold Storage Co., 80 Ill. App. 423 (1899); Mueller v.
Phelps, 252 Ill. 630, 97 N.E. 228 (1911); Haymarket Theater Co. v. Rosenberg, 77
Ill. App. 183 (1898).
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must be safely maintained. And the rule is not altered by
the fact that the disrepair was created by the act of an intermeddler, provided that the landlord had notice of its existence. 2 The landlord has also been held liable, under this
doctrine, for his failure to repair a defective roof, on the
theory that it remained under his control where he leased
only a portion of the building 13 or where he leased parts of
the building to separate tenants.1 4 And it has also been held
that he is liable for dangerous conditions in the boiler room
of the building, where the leased premises do not include
the boiler room.' 5 Likewise, it would seem that a fire sprinkler system installed by, and under the control of, the landlord must be maintained by him in a reasonably safe condition, even in regard to portions of the system on the premises
of the tenant. 6
The scope of the duty is to exercise reasonable care,'1 7 and
notice to the landlord of the dangerous condition must be
proved in order to establish his failure to exercise that
care." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply. 9
Notice may be proved by evidence that the landlord
has made an attempt to fix the condition" or that it has
been called to his attention, since such facts establish actual
knowledge.2 1 Notice may also be shown by proof of knowledge on the part of an agent employed in the maintenance
of the premises.2 2 And the proof of facts from which a reasonable, ordinary, and prudent man would have deduced the
presence of a defect has been held to constitute sufficient
12 Gorney v. Szynkiewicz, 174 Ill. App. 265 (1912).
13 See Johns v. Eichelberger, 109 Ill. App. 35 (1903).
14 Trower v. Wehner, 75 i1. App. 655 (1898); Rehbach v. Bogt, 126 Ill. App. 613
(1906).
15 Sherman v. Pardridge, 177 Ill. App, 304 (1913); Kennedy v. Heisen, 182 Ill.
App. 200 (1913).
16 Squire, Vandervoort & Co. v. Ryerson, 150 Ill. App. 255 (1909).
17 Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Boucher, 115 Ill. App. 101 (1904); Smith v.
Morrow, 230 111. App. 382 (1923).
18 Boske v. Collopy, 86 Ill. App. 268 (1899); Nelson v. Tunick, 250 Ill. App. 462
(1928); Burke v. Hulett, 216 Ill. 545, 75 N.E. 240 (1905).
19 Hopkins v. Sobra, 152 I1. App. 273 (1908). But the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does apply to the negligent operation of an elevator. See Springer v.
Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N.E. 953, 52 L.R.A. 930, 82 Am. St. Rep. 464 (1901).
20 Miller v. Spreyne, 189 Ill. App. 384 (1914).
21 Schwandt v. Metzger Linseed Oil Co., 93 Ill. App. 365 (1901).
22 Cwiklik v. Hrejsa, 167 III. App. 268 (1912); Fowler v. Crilly, 187 Ill. App. 399
(1914); Fenno v. Cullen, 162 Il. App. 283 (1911).
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evidence of notice, 23 as, for example, a showing that the
dangerous condition could have been ascertained by a reasonable, visual inspection of a stairway 4 or by some slight
application of force to a railing which otherwise appeared
to be sound.2 5
The leased premises, being in the exclusive possession of
the tenant, are not under the control of the landlord, and he
is not responsible for their maintenance, in the absence of a
contractual undertaking. 26 The one exception to this rule is
the situation where a lease is made for a very short period
of time, perhaps for a day or two, where the leasing is for a
specified purpose, and where the injury occurs in the course
of the contemplated use of the premises. 27 And this does not
seem to be a true exception, since the basis of liability in
such case seems to be the intention of the parties to the lease
that the landlord be responsible for the condition of the prem28
ises, in view of the nature of the holding.
The landlord may, however, contractually assume the duty
to repair or to keep safe the portions of the property included
in the lease. 29 There must be consideration for the promise.
If it is made at the time of the creation of the tenancy, the
mutual agreements in the lease will support it, 30 but if the
promise is made at a later time, a new consideration must
be furnished." In this connection it has been held that, since
a month to month tenancy is a continuous one, an agreement to repair which is made after the commencement of
such a periodic tenancy cannot be supported on the theory
that the promise was made in consideration of a new tenancy
which began the first of the next month following the promBodden v. Thomas, 192 InI. App. 348 (Abst., 1915).
See Fenno v. Cullen, 162 Ill. App. 283 (1911).
25 Smith v. Morrow, 230 Ill. App. 382 (1923).
26 See note 3 supra.
27 Koehler v. La Salle Turn Verein, 187 Ill. App. 340 (1914), where the duration
of the lease was one night and where the plaintiff, an officer of the tenant club,
fell through a trap door while he was engaged in the performance of his duties.
The premises were leased and used for a dance hall and bar room.
28 See also notes 79-91 infra for liability for conditions existing at time of lease.
29 Sontag v. O'Hare, 73 Ill. App. 432 (1898); Coyne v. Laubenheimer, 225 Ill.
App. 50 (1922); Wells v. Wise, 298 Ill. App. 252, 18 N.E. (2d) 750 (1939).
30 See note 31 infra.
31 Borggard v. Gale, 107 Ill. App. 128 (1903); Strong v. Soodvoisky, 141 InI. App.
183 (1908); Margolen v. de Haan, 226 Ill. App. 110 (1922); Dawson v. Kitch, 156
Ill. App. 185 (1910).
23
24
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ise.3 2 It cannot, however, be doubted that, if the parties so
intended, the tenant's agreement not to terminate a periodic
tenancy would be good consideration for the landlord's promise to repair. 3 And it would seem that in many cases involving a periodic tenancy it would be possible to establish an
express or an implied promise by the tenant not to terminate
the tenancy at the end of the next period, and thus the promise by the landlord could be sustained, despite the above
mentioned doctrine.
The scope of the duty which is imposed by the promise to
repair is dependent upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the lease contract. The general rules
of interpretation and construction, such as the doctrine of
4 and the principle that
expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
all of the terms of the contract must be interpreted together, 35 are applicable. Certain problems in this connection are
of particular interest because of the frequency with which
they arise.
Where the premises would be useless for the purpose for
which they were leased unless the landlord fits them for that
purpose, the lease is construed to place that duty upon him.
This result, it should be noticed, is not attained by a process
of interpreting the language of the parties to the lease. The
process is one of construction. The parties by failing to make
a provision in this regard have indicated that they did not
consider the matter. 6 Thus the court reads into the contract
a provision which it thinks the parties would have included
had the problem come to their attention. Examples of this
technique are numerous. If the leased premises are an apartment in an apartment building, the landlord is bound to fur32

Strong v. Soodvoisky, 141 Ill. App. 183 (1908).

See Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed., 1936), § 102A.
The specification of particular repairs to be made by the landlord impliedly
relieves him from the duty of making any other repairs. Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill.
523, 72 N.E. 1127 (1904); Carpenter v. Stone, 112 Ill. App. 155 (1904); Quinn v.
Crowe, 88 Ill. App. 191 (1900).
35 Soucy v. Louis Obert Brewing Co., 180 Ill. App. 69 (1913); Loop Office Bldg.
Corp. v. Hogan, 253 Ill. App. 574 (1929); First Trust & Savings Bank v. Raklios,
247 Ill. App. 183 (1928); Miland v. Meiswinkel, 82 Ill. App. 522 (1899).
36 They may have considered the problem, but their intention may not be
admissible in evidence because of some policy of the law, as the rule against
admissibility of parole evidence in the case of written contracts and the rule
against evidence of subjective intention in all contract cases.
33
34
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nish heat 37 and water. 38 And again, where premises were
leased for a dance hall for a day or two, it was held that the
landlord was bound to repair a trap door in the floor. 9 The
latter example illustrates the importance of the length of the
term of the lease in the application of this rule. If the lease is
for a very short period of time, it seems that the court will
impose a duty upon the landlord which it would not impose
were the term of longer duration.
Another important question of construction which has
arisen, involves the time within which the duty must be performed. Ordinarily, the courts have seen fit to stipulate that
repairs must be made within a "reasonable time." 40 However, where the alterations are essential to the use of the
premises contemplated by the parties, they must be completed before the commencement of the term, unless they are of
such a nature as to render such completion impossible.4 1
Where it is provided that the landlord shall make repairs
"in case the premises shall be rendered untenantable by fire
or other casualty," the duty does not arise until the condition
to the obligation has arisen. 42 In this connection it has been
held that a "casualty" is any occurrence which takes place
without fault on the part of the tenant and that an "act of
God," is not a requisite.4 3 This is a problem of interpreting
the language used. In another type of situation, a condition
precedent to the duty has been construed into the agreement. Thus, the duty has been held not to arise until the
landlord is notified of the need for repair,4 4 unless he has an
obligation to inspect the premises when the duty arises
from the existence of such facts as would inform a reason45
able man of the necessity for repair.
37 Giddings v. Williams, 336 Ill. 482, 168 N.E. 514 (1929); O'Donnell v. Rosenthal,
110 Ill.
App. 225 (1903).
38 Risser v. O'Connell, 172 Ill.
App. 64 (1912).
39 Koehler v. La Salle Turn Verein, 187 Ill.
App. 340 (1914).
40 Lunn v. Gage, 37 Ill.
19, 87 Am. Dec. 233 (1865).
41 Lunn v. Gage, 37 Ill.19, 87 Am. Dec. 233 (1865); Gibbons v. Hoefeld, 299
Ill.
455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921). Cf. Kesner v. Truax, 195 Ill.
App. 285 (1915).
42 John Morris Co. v. Southworth, 154 Ill.
118, 39 N.E. 1099 (1894); First Trust &
Savings Bank v. Raklios, 247 Ill. App. 183 (1928); Miland v. Meiswinkel, 82 Ill.
App. 522 (1899).
43 John Morris Co. v. Southworth, 154 Ill.118, 39 N.E. 1099 (1894).
44 Breazeale v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 293 Ill. App. 269, 12 N.E. (2d) 217
(1938).
45 See Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill.
App. 404 (1909). See also Fowler v. Crilly, 187
Ill. App. 399 (1914); Fenno v. Cullen, 162 Ill. App. 283 (1911).
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The landlord cannot defend his breach of an agreement to
repair on the grounds that it entails an uncontemplated expense, even where performance by him is thereby rendered
47
impossible. 6 However impossibility of an objective nature
or impossibility caused by the fault of the tenant or his subtenant will excuse the landlord from performance.4 8 These
matters are of no special significance in this field and will
not be emphasized.
The effects of a breach of the contractual obligation to repair are manyfold. Ordinarily the agreement of the tenant to
pay rent is independent of the agreement of the landlord to
repair, and a breach of the latter obligation is no excuse for
the nonperformance of the former. 49 The tenant must go on
paying his rent and sue the landlord to recover his damages.
The courts frequently state that the tenant may recoup his
damages in an action by the landlord for rent, thus implying
that the tenant may safely refuse to pay rent as long as his
damages resulting from the breach of the agreement to repair are equal to or in excess of the rent due.5" This is a
false notion. The landlord may elect to terminate the lease.
And it would be no defense to an action of forcible detainer
after forfeiture of the lease that the tenant has suffered damages from the landlord's nonperformance of the independent
covenant to repair.5
Sometimes, the tenant's agreement to pay rent is expressly conditioned upon the making of repairs, but this is rather
unusual. More frequently, the agreement to pay rent is construed to be dependent because of the circumstances under
which the lease was made. As explained above, the agreement to repair must be performed before the commencement of the term where performance is essential to the utility of the premises as contemplated- 2 In this case, as well
46 Gibbons v. Hoefeld, 299 Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921); Sweeting v. Reining,
235 Ill. App. 572 (1924).
47 See Risser v. O'Connell, 172 Ill. App. 64 (1912), where it is intimated that the
landlord's failure to supply water to the tenant because of failure of municipal
water supply during a hot season would not be cause for the tenant to abandon the
premises on a theory of constructive eviction. See also Morgan v. Cook, 213 IIl.
App. 172 (1919).
48 See First Trust & Savings Bank v. Raklios, 247 Ill. App. 183 (1928).
49 Clark v. Ford, 41 Ill. App. 199 (1891); Cote v. Landau, 240 Ill. App. 292 (1926).
50 See e.g. The Globe Ass'n v. Brega, 190 Ill. App. 60 (Abst., 1914).
51 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, II, 1372, § 194.
52 See note 41 supra.
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as when the parties expressly agree that repairs shall be
made before the commencement of the term, the courts have
construed the performance of the agreement as a condition
precedent to the duty of the tenant to enter into possession
and pay rent.2 If the repairs are not made, the tenant may
refuse to take possession under the lease and he may rescind
the entire transaction.5 4 But if the tenant takes possession,
he waives the condition precedent, the agreement to repair
becomes independent, and the tenant has only a right to recover damages from the landlord5 5 or, if the performance
does not result within a reasonable time, to abandon
the premises on a theory of constructive eviction. 6
Constructive eviction is the right of the tenant to abandon
the premises, thereby terminating the lease and all obligations thereunder, and this is one of the most important remedies available to the tenant in the event of the nonperformance of the contract to repair. A qualification upon this right
is that the injury from nonperformance must be substantial.5 7 A trivial breach, such as the failure to install a tooth
brush rack would seem insufficient to make this remedy available to the tenant. The breach of duty, it should be
noticed, need not be intentional or willful or malicious. There
is much language in the cases which would lead one to believe that there is a requisite of intention,5 8 but the courts
have not enforced such a doctrine.5 9 This is especially important with regard to breach of an agreement to repair, because it frequently occurs that the landlord becomes unable
to perform his duty because of some circumstance beyond
his control. The case of Gibbons v. Hoefeld6° is a perfect
example. The landlord agreed to repair the walls of the store
53 Kesner v. Truax, 195 Ill. App. 285 (1915); Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill. 523, 72 N.E.
1127 (1904).
54 Ibid.
55 Lunn v. Gage, 37 Ill. 19, 87 Am. Dec. 233 (1865).
56 Ibid. See also Petersen v. Slauf Mfg. Co., 251 Ill. App. 202 (1929).
57 See Saunders v. Fox, 178 Ill. App. 309 (1913), where the statement is made
that the act of the landlord must be of a grave and permanent character. The
statement is dicta in this case, it should be noted, inasmuch as there was a failure
of the tenant to abandon the premises after the alleged wrong of the landlord.
See also Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N.E. 805, 22 L.R.A. 544, 37 Am. St.
Rep. 175 (1893).
58 See, e.g. Morgan v. Cook, 213 Ill. App. 172 (1919).
59 See Harmony Co. v. Rauch, 64 Ill. App. 386 (1896); Sweeting v. Reining, 235
111. App. 572 (1924); Thomssen v. Meinersmann, 207 Ill. App. 110 (Abst., 1917).
60 299 Ill. 455, 132 N.E. 425 (1921).
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which he leased to the defendant tenant before the latter
took possession. The tenant moved into the store, thus waiving the condition precedent to his liability for rent that the
premises be fitted for store purposes' in consideration of
the landlord's agreement to remedy the damp condition of
the premises by repairing the walls. The landlord did everything in his power to prevent seepage, but it appeared that
he was unable to do so except by resort to the prohibitively
expensive procedure of building a new wall. The tenant abandoned the premises, and the court held that there was a constructive eviction. The final requisite of the remedy is that
the tenant abandon the premises.6 2 He cannot remain in possession and refuse to pay rent. The breach of an agreement
to repair is a continuous wrong until the repairs are made,
and the tenant may abandon the premises up to that time.6 3
But as long as he remains in possession, he must pay rent,
and if the landlord makes the repairs before abandonment
then the tenant has waived his right to treat nonperformance
as a constructive eviction. 4
An action for damages may be brought against the landlord for breach of his obligation, and the measure of recovery will be governed by the agreement of the parties,
if agreement there be in this regard.65 Ordinarily, however,
the parties contemplate that performance, not breach, will
result, and they fail to make any provision as to damages.
In this event, the court determines the recoverable damages,
and it frequently does so by means of the device of "construing" into the lease contract an intention which never
existed.6 6 By this technique, a number of Illinois Appellate
Court decisions have established a doctrine that, while
a promise to keep the premises in a safe condition indicates
an intention that the landlord will be liable for personal injuries suffered as a result of nonperformance, a promise to
repair does not.67 Under this rule the diminution in the value
61 See note 55 supra.
62 See Rubens v. Hill, 213 Ill. 523, 72 N.E. 1127 (1904). The possession of one
cotenant is the possession of both for this purpose, Kesner v. Truax, 195 Ill. App.
285 (1915).
63 See Lunn v. Gage, 37 Ill. 19, 87 Am. Dec. 233 (1865).
64 Ibid.
65 See note 67, infra.
66 See note 67, infra.
67 Cromwell v. Allen, 151 Ill. App. 404 (1909); Mikusz v. Kahn, 207 Ill. App. 258
(1917); Margolen v. de Haan, 226 Ill. App. 110 (1922); Breazeale v. Chicago Title
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of the premises is the only damage which can be recovered
for breach of an agreement to repair. 6s The doctrine seems
unsound, and it has been severely criticized in the latest judicial discussion of the matter. 69 It is true that a promise to
keep the premises in safe condition does seem to contemplate the risk of personal injury which would result from
breach, and fairness does seem to require that the injured
person be permitted to recover. It is equally true, however,
that an agreement to repair does not indicate that this type of
damage should not be recoverable. Since the actual intention
of the parties was never expressed in this regard, it is submitted that all damages should be recoverable which are the
ordinary and natural result of nonperformance. Thus, for example, if the landlord agrees to keep the premises in repair
and fails, so that the tenant in the exercise of due care is
tripped and injured by defective flooring which has been
called to the attention of the landlord, the latter should be
liable for the personal harm done to the tenant and not merely
for the diminution in the value of the premises because of the
defective floor. In a number of cases which did not discuss
the matter, recovery has been permitted for personal injuries and other proximate harm,7" and it is hoped that the
Supreme Court of Illinois will approve these decisions if and
when it is called upon to decide this question.
Either the tenant or a third party may recover for injury
proximately caused by the landlord's breach of his contractual duty to repair.7 1 The tenant, of course, is entitled to recovery on a contractual theory. The ground of the third party's right is not so clear, but it is submitted that the sound
basis is the prevention of circuity of action. Clearly, the tenand Trust Co., 293 Ill. App. 269, 12 N.E. (2d) 217 (1938); Farmer v. Alton Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n, 294 Ill. App. 206, 13 N.E. (2d) 652 (1938).
68 See note 67 supra.
69 Fonyo v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 227, 16 N.E. (2d) 192 (1938).
The court refused to pass on the question since the plaintiff was held to have been
guilty of contributory negligence.
70 Sontag v. O'Hare, 73 Ill. App. 432 (1898); Jacobson v. Ramey, 200 IL. App. 96
(Abst., 1915); Coyne v. Laubenheimer, 225 Ill. App. 50 (1922).
71 See Coyne v. Laubenheimer, 225 Ill. App. 50 (1922); Boyce v. Tallerman, 183
Ill. 115 (1899); Reichenbacher v. Pahmeyer, 8 Ill. App. 217 (1881). In the Boyce
case, the landlord negligently erected a smokestack, which caused the injury, and
in the Reichenbacher case, the landlord fraudulently concealed a dangerous condition from the tenant. Thus the statement is dictum in each case, since liability .was
not predicated on failure to perform a promise to repair.
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ant in control of the property is not relieved from his duty
to exercise reasonable care in that control, despite his contractual agreement with the landlord that the latter will perform the tenant's duty. 2 Therefore, the injured third party
has a cause of action against the tenant for the former's injury, and since the tenant, if he were required to pay damages to the third party, would be entitled to recovery thereof
from the landlord as damages for the latter's breach of contract, the third party's recovery from the landlord prevents
this circuity of action. It has been suggested that this is an
unsound basis for permitting recovery, since the agreement
to repair, in the absence of some indication to the contrary,
does not show an intention that the landlord should be liable,
in the event of default, for the tenant's liability to a third
party, inasmuch as recovery for the diminution in the value
of the premises is the only recovery contemplated by the
parties to the lease. 3 As has been indicated above, this contention is unsound, and it is submitted that the cases permitting the injured third party to recover from the landlord are
authority against such an argument, since they can only be
supported on the theory of avoidance of circuity of action.
Two other bases for the landlord's liability to a third person
are possible, one being that the landlord regains control of
the premises to the extent of his agreement to repair and
hence is chargeable in tort and the other being that the third
party has a contractual right as beneficiary of the contract
between the landlord and the tenant. The latter theory is
clearly faulty in that no direct benefit is usually intended to
accrue to the third party, either as an individual or as the
member of a class.74 And obviously the landlord does not
regain control of the premises because of his duty to repair 75
-indeed he would be a trespasser if he entered thereon
against the wishes of the tenant. It is therefore submitted
that prevention of circuity of action is the only sound basis
Cochran v. Kankakee Stone & Lime Co., 179 Ill. App. 437 (1913).
Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, § 107. If this is the true basis for the landlord's
liability, it should be noted that the cases permitting recovery are opposed in
theory to those limiting liability for breach of covenant to repair to the amount
of the dimunition in the value of the premises. See note 41 supra.
74 Pitts v. Kelly, 234 Ill. App. 403 (1924).
75 See Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N.E. 553 (1898). But see
Coyne v. Laubenheimer, 225 Ill. App. 50 (1922), in which the court seems to assume
that the duty is owed by the landlord to the third party and not to the tenant.
72
73
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for permitting recovery by a third party, and thus it is to be
expected, although no cases in point have been found, that
circumstances insulating the tenant from liability will prevent recovery by the third party from the landlord.
Where the landlord has no duty to keep the premises safe,
nevertheless if he does undertake the task, he is liable for a
,failure to exercise reasonable care.7" But the gratuitous execution of one or more repairs imposes no duty upon him to
continue to perform, unless his failure would leave a project
commenced by him in a dangerously uncompleted condition.7 7 In this connection, it has been held that where the
landlord bolstered a porch for the purpose of rendering it
safe for the moving of a piano, he was not liable for any injury occurring after the piano had been moved, since his assumption of duty was limited to the use of the porch on the
one occasion.7 8
Ordinarily the landlord is not liable for injuries which occur after the commencement of the tenancy, where the defective condition exists at the time of the making of
the lease. The tenant cannot recover, since he, as purchaser
of an interest in land, must be on his guard against the seller
and cannot be heard to complain if the property which he
purchased was in bad condition.7 9 Third parties cannot recover, for the landlord is not responsible for the condition of
property which is not under his control.8 " To the general
rule, however, an exception has been made. Where a latent
defect" known to the landlord8 2 and existing at the time of
76 Glassman v. Abromovich, 163 Ill. App. 388 (1911). See also Anderson v. Moore,
108 Ill. App. 106 (1903); O'Donell v. Rosenthal, 110 nil. App. 225 (1903).
77 Quinn v. Crowe, 88 111. App. 191 (1900).
78 Miskell v. Boydston, 152 Ill. App. 66 (1909). The case is weakened by the fact
that the plaintiff admitted that she saw the removal of the props used to bolster
the porch, although the landlord insisted, and the evidence seemed to show, that
the props were not removed. The plaintiff by her admission brings the element of
contributory negligence into consideration.
79 Shields v. J. H. Dole Co., 186 Ill. App. 250 (1914); Gathemann v. Rosenfeld,
190 Ill. App. 110 (Abst., 1914).
80 See notes 2 and 3 supra.
81 Borggard v. Gale, 107 Ill. App. 128 (1903); Lazarus & Cohen v. Parmly, 113
Ill. App. 624 (1904); Mikusz v. Kahn, 207 IlM. App. 258 (1917). See also Long v.
Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 214 Ill. App. 517 (1919); Fowler Cycle Works v. Fraser
& Chalmers, 110 Ill. App. 126 (1903); Shields v. J. H. Dole Co., 186 Il. App. 250
(1914).
82 Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902); Lovas v. Independent
Breweries Co., 199 Ill. App. 60 (Abst., 1916). See also McCoull v. Herzberg, 33 Ill.
App. 542 (1889); Long v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 214 Ill. App. 517 (1919).
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the lease"3 is not disclosed to the tenant,"' the landlord is
liable for resultant injuries to the tenant and third parties.80
In the case of a periodic tenancy, the dangerous condition
must be in existence at the beginning of the tenancy, or this
doctrine may not be invoked. Such a holding is a continuous
one and not a series of tenancies beginning each month or
each year, as the case may be. Thus where the premises
were safe when leased and where they became unsafe after
several months of a month to month tenancy, the plaintiff
was denied recovery. 86
The ground of liability, under this doctrine is not entirely
clear. The courts speak of fraud upon the tenant by the nondisclosure of known defects, 7 but such a theory would not
support an action by third parties, since they would have no
right to rely on the implied representations to the tenant.8 8
And it is clear that third parties may recover. 89 It is submitted that the sound basis for the landlord's responsibility
in this situation is that he has so acted as to cause an unreasonable risk of danger to others, in view of all the factors
present at the time of the making of the lease. It is unnecessary to apply a label, such as negligence or fraud, to the
wrong.
Another exception to the general rule that the landlord is
not responsible for injuries resulting from defects which
were in existence at the time of the commencement of the
tenancy is the situation where a lease is made for a very
short period of time, where the premises are leased and are
apparently suitable for a specified purpose, and where the
injury occurs in the course of the contemplated use. 0 In this
case, the knowledge of the defect by the landlord is not material; he is responsible for failure to exercise ordinary care
See note 86 infra.
Reichenbacher v. Pahmeyer, 8 Ill.
App. 217 (1881); Sunasack v. Morey, 196
Ill. 569, 63 N.E. 1039 (1902).
85 See notes 82 and 84 supra.
86 Dawson v. Kitch, 156 Ill.
App. 185 (1910). But see Borman v. Sandgren, 37
Ill. App. 160 (1890). See also Hull v. Sherrod, 97 Ill. App. 298 (1901).
87 See Blake v. Ranous, 25 Ill.
App. 486 (1888); McCoull v. Herzberg, 33 Ill. App.
542 (1889).
88 See Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, § 96, p. 653, 654.
89 See notes 82 and 34 supra.
90 See note 27 supra.
83
84
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in detecting the condition.9 1 This exception can be justified
on the grounds that the landlord and the tenant, in such case,
do not generally contemplate that the tenant will have to
repair the premises before he can use them for the stipulated
purpose. The duty of the landlord, since it arises from the
intention of the parties to the lease, should logically be regarded as one arising from the contract and thus one that
can be negatived by express terms. Recovery by a third
party may be justified on the ground that it prevents circuity
of action.
Not everyone who is injured as a result of the landlord's
failure to put or keep the premises in a safe condition may
recover, since a duty is owed only to certain persons. Parties
who, as against the landlord, have a right to be in the place
where the injury occurs are protected. Thus a tenant who
suffers an injury to himself or his property as a result of his
use of the leased premises or a common passageway may
recover.92 A sublessee may also recover, 93 and it has been indicated that this rule applies even where the terms of the
lease forbid a sublease. 4 Persons who are in the unsafe
place for the mutual benefit of the landlord and themselves
or for a use of the premises contemplated by the lease are
commonly designated invitees, and a duty is owed to them. 5
This class includes the tenant's or the sublessee's" fain91 Ibid.
92 Sherman v. Pardridge, 177 Ill. App. 304 (1913); Smith v. Morrow, 230 Ill. App.
382 (1923); Squire, Vandervoort & Co. v. Ryerson, 150 Ill. App. 255 (1909).
93 See Dawson v. Kitch, 156 Ill. App. 185 (1910).
94 Told v. Madison Building Co., 216 Ill. App. 29 (1919). The negligence in this
case was the careless operation of an elevator in which the plaintiff was riding.
Since the landlord and his agents owe a duty to refrain from active negligence
even to known trespassers, the issue was not raised in this case, but the court
indicated that a duty to keep the premises in a safe condition would be owed to
the plaintiff-sublessee. This seems sound, since the effect of the tenant's breach of
a covenant not to sublease is to render him subject to an action on the part of the
landlord for damages or possibly specific performance. But the sublease is still
effective to convey an interest in the property to the sublessee, until the landlord
takes action for specific performance.

95 See notes 96-100 infra.
96 It would seem to be uncontrovertable that the sublessee's family, social
guests, etc. have the same rights as the tenant's. There are no cases in point, but
see Dawson v. Kitch, 156 Ill. App. 185 (1910); Squire, Vandervoort & Co. v. Ryerson, 150 Ill. App. 255 (1909).
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ily, 91 employees, 98 social guests, 99 and business guests'
who use the leased premises or the common passageways.
And it has been held that a municipal inspector who, at the
tenant's request, entered a boiler room which was under control of the landlord was an invitee, where an ordinance made
an inspection a prerequisite to the installation of a meter
which was required to be installed by the terms of the
lease. '
There is no duty owed to persons, generally designated as
licensees, whose only right to be in the unsafe place is the
permission of the landlord, and this rule applies to tenants
and their families. 10 2 For example, a tenant's wife who
used, by permission of the landlord, a storeroom in the basement of the building could not recover for an injury caused
by exposed wires on a light switch in the storeroom. 0 3

Neither is a duty owed to trespassers,'0 4 except in the
situation where the injured party is a child who is drawn to
the premises by a dangerous and attractive condition. 105 Recovery under this doctrine requires that the landlord have
notice of the condition as well as notice of its attractive106
ness.
The breach of duty must not only be a cause 1 7 of the injury to the person to whom the duty is owed, but it must be
97 Bodden v. Thomas, 192 Ill. App. 348 (Abst., 1915); Schwandt v. Metzger Linseed Oil Co., 93 Ill. App. 365 (1901), injury to wife of tenant; Miller v. Spreyne,
189 Ill. App. 384 (1914), also injury to wife of tenant; Sontag v. O'Hare, 73 Ill. App.
432 (1898), child of tenant; Jacobsen v. Ramey, 200 Ill. App. 96 (1915), child;
Wells v. Wise, 298 Ill. App. 252, 18 N.E. (2d) 750 (1939), also involving injury to
a child of the tenant.
98 Reichenbacher v. Pahmeyer, 8 Ill. App. 217 (1881); Coyne v. Laubenheimer,
225 Ill. App. 50 (1922); Soibel v. Oconto Co., 299 Ill. App. 518, 20 N.E. (2d) 309
(1939), where it was held, following the Shields case, that the duty to the tenant's
employee is no greater than that owed to the tenant.
99 Borman v. Sandgren, 37 Ill. App. 160 (1890); Fisher v. Jansen, 30 ll. App.
91 (1889), aff'd, 128 Ill. 549, 21 N.E. 598 (1889).
100 See Burke v. Hulett, 216 Ill. 545, 75 N.E. 240 (1905).
101 Kennedy v. Heisen, 182 1l. App. 200 (1913).
102 See Jacobs v. Michel, 137 Ill. App. 221 (1907); Culver v. Kingsley, 78 Ill. App.
540 (1898); Saffer v. Molter, 124 Ill. App. 21 (1905) ; Cameron v. Feely, 208 Il1.
App. 521 (1917).
103 Hansen v. Gromol, 232 Ill. App. 485 (1924).
104 See Jacobs v. Michel, 137 Ill. App. 221 (1907).
105 Cochran v. Kankakee Stone & Lime Co., 179 Ill. App. 437 (1913).
106 Farmer v. Alton Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 294 Ill. App. 206, 13 N.E. (2d) 652 (1938).
107 Devine v. Ficklin, 192 Ill. App. 593 (Abst., 1915); Burke v. Hulett, 216 Ill.
545, 75 N.E. 240 (1905) ; Winn v. Keep, 205 Ill. App. 618 (1917) ; O'Donnell v. Rosenthal, 110 Ill. App. 225 (1903).
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the proximate cause, that is, it must bring about the injury
through a natural sequence of events. 0 8 The question is one
for the jury, if the facts are in dispute or if reasonable men
might differ as to whether or not the sequence of events leading to the injury is a natural one. 0 9 The landlord is not liable if the injury is occasioned by the negligent use of the
defective premises by a tenant"0 or a member of his household"' even where that use is made of the premises because
any other mode of utilization would be inconvenient because of the defective condition. For example, the landlord has been held not liable for an injury to a child of the
tenant caused by the negligence of the latter's wife in allowing a trap door to stand open because it stuck when closed
and because it was the only convenient way to the cellar
112
which was frequently used by her.
The defense of contributory negligence is based on the theory that proximate cause is lacking, since the plaintiff's
careless act intervenes to break the sequence of events started by the defendant's fault. 1 3 Contributory negligence is a
failure by the plaintiff to exercise that degree of care which
a reasonable, ordinary and prudent man would have exercised under similar circumstances." 4 The question is one for
the jury where the facts are in dispute or where reasonable
men might differ as to the carelessness of the plaintiff's conduct." 5 The doctrine is frequently stated by the courts in
the form of a rule that the landlord is not liable for an uncontemplated use of the premises,"' but recovery has been
denied only in cases where the injured party was negligent.
108

Mendel v. Fink, 3 Ill. App. 378 (1881); McGinnis v. Berven, 16 Ill. App. 354

(1885).
109 See Burke v. Hulett. 216 Ill. 545, 75 N.E. 240 (1905); Christiansen v. Navigato,
185 Ill. App. 318 (1914).
110 McGinnis v. Berven, 16 Ill. App. 354 (1885); Nelson v. Tunick, 250 Il. App.
462 (1928); Weston v. Hicks, 203 Ill. App. 491 (1916); Hull v. Sherrod, 97 Ill. App.
298 (1901); Greene v. Hague, 10 Ill. App. 598 (1882); Mendel v. Fink, 8 Ill. App. 378
(1881); Taylor v. Bailey, 74 Ill. 178 (1874).
111 Richason v. Chicagc & Western Indiana R.R. Co., 150 Ill. App. 38 (1909).
112

Ibid.

113 See Arling v. Zeitz. 269 Ill. App. 562 (1933).
114 See note 90 infra.
115 Christiansen v. Navigato, 185 1il. App. 318 (1914); Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill.
630, 97 N.E. 228 (1911); Green v. Y.M.C.A., 65 Ill. App. 459 (1896).
116 Parnler v. Byrd, 131 Ill. App. 495 (1907); Fenno v. Cullen, 162 111. App. 283
(1911); Pozdal v. Heisen, 184 Ill. App. 441 (1913); 'Qwrozek v. Pollan, 209 Ill. App.
576 (Abst., 1918).
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Thus, the plaintiff was permitted to recover where she unwittingly placed her weight against a defective railing in order to assist herself in stepping from an adjoining roof to a
common passageway, although this use of the railing was
apparently quite uncontemplated by the landlord and the tenant at the time of the lease. 117 On the other hand, recovery
was denied to a plaintiff who, in order to call to a fellow
worker on the floor below, put his head in an elevator shaft
and was struck by a descending elevator." 8 In this case the
unusual use of the premises involved lack of due care. It
seems that a person who continues to use the premises after
knowledge that they have been in a defective condition is
contributorily negligent,' 19 unless he has reason to believe
that they have been repaired. 2 ' However, it has been held
that the plaintiff is not negligent by failing to anticipate the
landlord's careless conduct in leaving open and unguarded a
trap door in a common sidewalk. 121 And this rule should apply to any actively negligent conduct of the landlord.
Whether or not a young child can be contributorily negligent is an unsettled matter. Some decisions state that he
can, 122 and some that he cannot, 12 be barred from recovery
by reason of his careless conduct, but all of the cases in the
latter class involve dangerous conditions of an attractive nature of which the landlord had notice. 124 This would seem to
establish the rule that a child can be negligent so as to bar
his recovery, unless the presence of an attractive condition
of which the landlord has notice creates a situation in which
the child's negligence is one of the natural, since foreseeable,
factors leading to the injury. This is sound, since the question
117 Powrozek v. Pollan, 209 Ill. App. 576 (Abst., 1918).

Pozdal v. Heisen, 184 Ill. App. 441 (1913).
119 Martin v. Surman, 116 Ill. App. 282 (1904); Pamler v. Byrd, 131 Ill. App. 495
(1907); Panteles v. Arsht, 227 fI. App. 488 (1923); Day v. Talcott, 361 Ill. 437, 198
N.E. 339 (1935); Fonyo v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 296 Ill. App. 227, 16 N.E. (2d)
192 (1938).
120 Udwin v. Spirkel, 136 Ill. App. 155 (1907).
121 Sprengel v. Schroeder, 203 i1. App. 213 (Abst., 1917).
122 Rayfield v. Sans Souci Park, 147 Ill. App. 493 (1909); Young v. Williams, 167
Ill. App. 8 (1912).
123 Fowler v. Crilly, 187 I.
App. 399 (1914); Whitney v. Derby, 210 Ill. App. 107
(Abst., 1918).
124 See Cochran v. Kankakee Stone & Lime Co., 179 IUl. App. 437 (1913) and note
123 supra. In Farmer v. Alton Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 294 Ill. App. 206, 13 N.E. (2d)
652 (1938), recovery was denied for want of notice of the dangerous condition.
118
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is not one of the capacity of the child to be guilty of negligence, as the courts frequently state it, 125 but whether or
not the injury flows naturally, hence proximately, from the
negligent conduct of the defendant.
Closely connected with the doctrine of contributory negligence is that of assumption of the risk of injury. There are
but few decisions which discuss the point, and some of them
state that the rule, being founded in the employment relationship, has no application to the landlord's liability for the
defective condition of the premises. 126 It is submitted that
this is unsound since it is obvious that a person could expressly assume the risk. It is probable that what is meant by
these statements is that the doctrine enunciated in the employment cases, that mere knowledge of the defect on the
part of the injured person will constitute an assumption of
the risk of harm from that defect, will not be applied to the
liability of the landlord in this situation. 2 7
The landlord and the tenant may contractually agree that
the former will not be liable for injuries resulting from the
condition of the premises and such agreements have been
held not to be illegal.'2 8 The scope of such exculpatory provisions depends, of course, upon the intention of the parties
to the lease.' 29 As a general rule, the landlord is held not to
be relieved from the consequences of his affirmative, negligent conduct'30 or his failure to repair after he has actual
Fowler v. Crilly, 187 Ill. App. 399 at 404 (1914).
B. Shoninger Co. v. Mann, 219 Ill. 242, 76 N.E. 354, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1097
(1905); Mueller v. Phelps, 252 Ill. 630, 97 N.E. 228 (1911).
127 Fenno v. Cullen, 162 Ill. App. 283 (1911). See also Helbig v. Slaughter, 95 Ill.
App. 623 (1901); Pamler v. Byrd, 131 Ill. App. 495 (1907), where the doctrine of
assumption of the risk is stated in an extreme way to deny recovery to a plaintiff
who was obviously contributorily negligent.
128 Hopkins v. Sobra, 152 Ill. App. 273 (1908), where the statement that such an
agreement was not illegal was dicta, since it was established that the plaintiff was
a licensee, and there was no proof of negligence. See also Arling v. Zeitz, 269 Ill.
App. 562 (1933), where it was held to be error for the trial court to exclude exculpatory clauses from the evidence. See also Taylor v. Bailey, 74 Ill. 178 (1874).
129 Dickey v. Wells, 203 Ill. App. 305 (1917); Green v. Y.M.C.A., 65 Ill. App. 459
(1896).
130 Chapman & Smith Co. v. Crown Novelty Co., 175 Ill. App. 397 (1912), where
there is an inference that exculpation from leakage from water closets, pipes, etc.
would not have relieved the landlord from liability for his affirmative, negligent
conduct, since the court expressly stated that there was no evidence of such conduct. See also Dickey v. Wells, 203 Ill. App. 305 (1917); Green v. Y.M.C.A., 65 Ill.
App. 459 (1896).
125
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knowledge of the dangerous condition. 31 The same reasoning would deny him exculpation where he leases the premises with known, but latent, defects which he fails to disclose
to the tenant. 132 Furthermore, such an agreement only relieves the landlord from liability to the tenant and not from
responsibility to third persons who are injured by his negli33
gence, since they are not bound by the tenant's contract.
It should be noted that if the provision does indicate an intention that the landlord shall be relieved from his or his
agents' active negligence the provision is effective, and it is
not invalid as against public policy, inasmuch as the public
has no interest in this type of contract. 34
Where harm occurs as the result of a dangerous condition
existing on the premises or on a portion of the public way
adjoining the premises, the landlord may be liable to a person who is injured while on his own property or on the public
way. 135 For example, where the landlord built a coal cellar
beneath a public sidewalk and placed a defective cover on an
opening in the sidewalk, he was held responsible for resulting
injuries to a pedestrian although 36the harm occurred after the
1
commencement of the tenancy.
If the landlord is in control of the part of the premises to
which the dangerous condition is appurtenant, he is liable for
his negligent management. 137 If, however, he is no longer
in possession, inasmuch as he has leased the property, he is
responsible for the injury, if he created the defective condition 3 8 or if it occurred prior to the lease.' 3 9 And this rule is
131 Arling v. Zeitz, 269 Ill. App. 562 (1933).
132 See McIntyre, Ltd. v. Chanler Holding Co., 16 N.Y.S.

(2d) 642 (1939),

dis-

cussed in 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW 318.

133 Springer v. Ford, 189 Ill. 430, 59 N.E. 953, 52 L.R.A. 930, 82 Am. St. Rep. 464
(1901); Helbig v. Slaughter, 95 Ill. App. 623 (1901).
134 World's Columbian Exposition Co. v. Republic of France, 96 F. 687 (1899);
Checkley v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 257 Ill. 491, 100 N.E. 942, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.)
1127, Ann. Cas. 1914A, 1202 (1913); Weirick v. Hamm Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25,
228 N.W. 175 (1929).
135 City of Canton v. Torrance, 151 Ill. App. 129 (1909).
136 Ibid.
137 Helbig v. Slaughter, 95

i. App. 623 (1901); Payne v. Irvin, 144 Ill. 482, 33
N.E. 756 (1893).
138 Tomle v. Hampton, 129 Ill. 379, 21 N.E. 800 (1889); Stephani v. Brown, 40
Ill. 428 (1866); Boyce v. Tallerman, 183 Ili. 115, 55 N.E. 703 (1899); Boyce v. Snow,
187 Ill. 181 58 N.E. 403 (1900).
139 Gronlund v. Forsman, 124 -Ill. App. 362 (1906) ; Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App.
438 (1907); Foley v. Everett, 142 Ill. App. 250 (1908); Hanrahan v. F. Salter & Co.,
182 Ill. App. 161 (1913).
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not changed by the fact that the tenant expressly contracts
140
to be responsible for the safe condition of the premises,
since the landlord's liability in this situation is based upon
his previous, negligent erection or maintenance of a dangerous condition, generally termed a nuisance.' 4 '
While the landlord is ordinarily not liable if the premises
were in a safe condition when he leased them,'4 2 he is responsible if the defective condition is a result of his failure
to perform a contractual duty to repair. 4 3 The basis of this
liability is the avoidance of circuity of action, since the tenant in control is liable to the third party' despite the landlord's contractual duty to repair, and the tenant then has a
14 5
remedy against the landlord for breach of his agreement.
Where liability is predicated on the creation or previous
maintenance of a nuisance, the plaintiff must have suffered
the injury as a member of the public', or as the occupant
of adjoining premises.' 4 ' The lease has the effect of terminating the duty to the tenant or the subtenant or their invitees. 45 In this regard, it has been held that a landlord who
constructs his property in such a manner as to make part of
it seem to be a portion of the public way, he is liable to persons who are injured on the apparently public property. 14 9
Thus a plaintiff was allowed to recover where, at the time of
the injury, he was on a portion of the defendant's premises
between a fence and a public alley, inasmuch as all of the
property in front of the fence seemed to be part of the alley. 50 In another case recovery was permitted where the
140 Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App. 438 (1907); Foley v. Everett, 142 InI. App. 250
(1908); Helbig v. Slaughter, 95 Ill. App. 623 (1901). It seems clear that the agreement does not add to the tenant's responsibility, since he, being the party in possession, would have a duty to keep the premises reasonably safe, even in the
absence of contract.
141 See Stephani v. Brown, 40 Ill. 428 (1866).
142 Union Brass Mfg. Co. v. Lindsay, 10 Il.
App. 583 (1882); West Chicago
Masonic Ass'n v. Cohn, 192 Ill. 210, 61 N.E. 439, 55 L.R.A. 235, 85 Am. St. Rep. 327
(1901).
143 See Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47 (1873); West Chicago Masonic
Ass'n v. Cohn, 192 Ill. 210, 61 N.E. 439, 55 L.R.A. 235, 85 Am. St. Rep. 327 (1901).
144 See Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68 Ill. 47 (1873).
145 See Stephani v. Brown, 40 Ill. 428 (1866).
146 See notes 135 and 136 supra.
147 See notes 135 and 136 supra.
148 See note 3 supra.
149 Tomle v. Hampton, 129 Ill. 379, 21 N.E. 800 (1889); Everett v. Foley, 132 fI1.
App. 438 (1907); Foley v. Everett, 142 Ill. App. 250 (1908).
150 Everett v. Foley, 132 Ill. App. 438 (1907).
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injury occurred on an extension of a public sidewalk leading
to a show window in the front of the premises.' 5 ' The doctrine seems sound. It is reasonable that the same duty be
owed to a person on the defendant's property which he has
caused to appear as part of the public way as is owed to one
actually on the way. A person should not be required to carry
a plat and a ruler when he goes for a walk.
Ordinarily, the fundamental basis of the landlord's liability
in this situation is his lack of due care. He is not an insurer
of the safety of persons or property off the premises, and if
he has acted reasonably, he is not liable, even if the premises are actually in a dangerous condition at the time he leases
them. 152 The courts state that the ground of responsibility is
the creation or the maintenance of a nuisance,'
but a nuisance requires wrongful conduct, and in order to prove a
wrong in this situation, lack of reasonable care must be
shown. 54 There is an exception to the requirement of negligence, where the landlord's wrong is committed by interference with the public easement, and in this case he is liable
for injury proximately caused no matter how carefully he
acted in creating the condition which caused the harm.'55
For example, where a landlord, without a required municipal license, builds a coal cellar beneath a public sidewalk
through which he constructs an opening to the cellar below,
he is liable for an injury to a member of the public regardless of the question of due care. 156
As in the preceding instances of liability, the wrong of the
landlord must operate in an ordinary, natural fashion'5 7 to
151 Tomle v. Hampton, 129 Ill. 379, 21 N.E. 800 (1889).
152 See Payne v. Irvin, 144 IIl. 482, 33 N.E. 756 (1893); Stephani v. Brown, 40 IMl.
428 (1866). In these cases the courts assume that liability is based on negligence.
153 See c.g. Tomle v. Hampton, 129 II. 379, 21 N.E. 800 (1889).
154 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, I, 680, § 102. See also Throckmorton's Cooley
on Torts (1930), § 284.
155 See note 143 supra.
156 See Stephani v. Brown, 40 Ill. 428 (1866), where the court assumed that there
was liability without negligence, but where the approved instruction required careless conduct. Since the jury found for the plaintiff, the court was not obliged to
criticize the instruction on this ground. The effect of the doctrine that negligence
is not required is mitigated by such cases as Gridley v. City of Bloomington, 68
Ill. 47 (1873), where it was assumed that the municipal license had been given,
since the vault in question had been in existence for many years without objection
by the city authorities.
157 Helbig v. Slaughter, 95 Ill. App. 623 (1901). See also Stephani v. Brown, 40
nI. 428 (18); City of Canton v. Torrance, 151 Ill. App. 129 (1909),
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cause the injury to the plaintiff, and the latter's careless conduct, as an intervening factor, will have the effect of reliev58
ing the defendant from responsibility.1
There are very few cases dealing with the tenant's common law5 9 liability for injuries resulting from the defective
condition of the premises. Those decisions that have been
made follow very closely the pattern of the cases dealing
with the landlord's responsibility.
The tenant has a duty to keep in a reasonably safe condition the portions of the property in his possession. 6 ' And
this duty is not alleviated, as to third persons, by the landlord's contractual agreement to keep the premises in re161
pair.
In regard to property not included in the lease, the tenant
ordinarily has no obligation.1 62 However, he may contractually assume the landlord's duty to keep such property in repair, and in the event of failure to perform, he must compensate the landlord for the latter's liability to third persons. 163 On the theory that circuity of action would be avoided, it seems that the third party should be able to recover
directly from the tenant,"' in this situation, but there are no
cases in point. The scope of the contractual duty is determined by the intention of the parties to the lease, "and all of
the provisions must be read together. Thus, a provision to
the effect that the tenant was only responsible for repairs
necessitated by fire in the event of his negligence was not
given the construction that the tenant was liable for all other
repairs, regardless of negligence, where another clause stated that in case "said premises shall be rendered untenantable by fire or other casualty, the lessor may, at his option
158 See note 157 supra.
159 For the tenant's statutory liability see notes 172-183 infra.
160 Thomas v. Vannucci, 185 Ill.
App. 414 (1914); Cleveland co-operative Stove
Co. v. Wheeler, 14 Ill. App. 112 (1883); Chicago Telephone Co. v. Commercial
Union Assur. Co., 131 IlM.App. 248 (1907).
161 Cochran v. Kankakee Stone & Lime Co., 179 IM. App. 437 (1913); Johanson v.
The William Johnston Printing Co., 263 Ill.
236, 104 N.E. 1046 (1914), holding that
the tenant was not liable where the landlord had contractually assumed the duty
of control, can be distinguished on the ground that the injury occurred not by reason of a defect in the premises but because of the negligence of one of the tenant's
agents acting outside of the scope of his authority.
162 Haisler v. Hayden, 124 Ill. App. 264 (1906). See also notes 5-15 supra.
163 Trego v. Rubovits, 228 Ill. App. 559 (1923).
164 See notes 72-75 supra.
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terminate this lease or repair the premises within thirty
days, and failing so to do, or upon the destruction of the
premises by fire, the term hereby created shall cease and
determine." It was held by the court that a boiler explosion
was a "casualty" within the meaning of the lease and that
the tenant was not responsible for the harm, inasmuch as
there had been no proof of his negligence. 165
Where no duty exists by virtue of control or contractual
obligation, the tenant is nevertheless charged with responsibility for the exercise of due care in the making of gratuitous repairs.'6 6
The duty in each of the situations discussed above is owed
only to invitees; there is no responsibility to licensees or tres167
passers,'
except in the case of an "attractive nui8
sance."16
The scope of the obligation, in the absence of contractual
provision, is to exercise reasonable care under all of the
facts and circumstances. 169 In this regard, all the rules relating to the extent of the landlord's duty should apply. 170
And, as in every case, there must be a natural, causal connection between the tenant's breach of duty and the resulting injury to the plaintiff.'
The landlord and the tenant must comply with legislative
enactments which regulate their control of the premises, and
if the legislative body intends, by the act, to impose a duty to
persons who may suffer injury as a result of noncompliance,
a party who is in fact injured may predicate an action upon
the violation of the enactment, 1 72 despite the fact that no
criminal prosecution has been commenced' 7 The class of
165 John Morris Co. v. Southworth, 154 Ill. 118 (1894).
166 Pisko v. United Breweries Co., 181 Ill.
App. 542 (1913). This case illustrates
the fact that gratuitous repairs must be carefully made, no matter who makes
them. In this case, the defendant was a tenant who had subleased the premises,
and the court in deciding in favor of the plaintiff placed no stress upon the defendant's status as tenant.
167 See notes 92-104 supra. The question has not been raised in any of the cases
involving liability of a tenant, but the principles involved are the same as in the
decisions involving the liability of the landlord.
168 See notes 105 and 106 supra.
169 Haisler v. Hayden, 124 Ill.
App. 264 (1906); Chicago Telephone Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co., 131 Ill.
App. 248 (1907).
170 See notes 17-25 supra.
171 See notes 107-127 supra.
172 Cowen v. Story & Clark Piano Co., 170 Ill.
App. 92 (1912).
173 Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N.E. 851 (1901).
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persons to whom the duty is owed is determined by the intention of the legislature,' 4 and it would seem that ordinarily a licensee or a trespasser is not protected.'
It has been
held, for example, that a member of a fire insurance patrol
who was injured by a defective condition during the extinguishment of a fire was not entitled to recover, since the
ordinance upon which the suit was predicated was designed
to protect employees.' 76 The legislative intent also determines the person upon whom the duty is imposed. It has
been decided that an act placing a duty upon the "owner,
trustee, lessee, or occupant" of a building to erect and maintain certain safety devices places liability upon the landlord
where he has leased separate parts of the premises to various persons,'7 7 upon the tenant where the lease included the
entire building and was made prior to the enactment,'.7 upon the tenant where subsequent to the act the entire premises were leased with the required devices,'1 79 and upon both
the landlord and the tenant where the lease was made after
the act and while the premises were without the required
apparatus. 8 0 It has also been held that there is no civil liability for breach of an enactment where the injury occurs
after the defendant, violator of an act, has conveyed the
property.' 8 ' However, where the duty is imposed upon a party who constructs something, he will be liable by reason of
the violation, despite the fact that he is a landlord who has
created a structure upon the premises in the possession of
2
the tenant upon whom the lease placed the duty of repair. 18
This liability does not arise from the maintenance and control of the premises but from the erection of the structure in
174 Gibson v. Leonard, 143 Ill. 182, 32 N.E. 182, 17 L.R.A. 588, 36 Am. St. Rep.
376 (1892).
175 Ibid.; Marcovitz v. Hergenrether, 302 111. 162, 134 N.E. 85 (1922).
176 Gibson v. Leonard, note 174 supra.
177 Landgraf v. Kuh, 188 IMi. 484, 59 N.E. 501 (1900).
178 Arms v. Ayer, 192 Ill. 601, 61 N.E. 851 (1901).
179 Marcovitz v. Hergenrether, 302 IMI.162, 134 N.E. 85 (1922).
180 Cowen v. Story & Clark Piano Co., 170 IMI. App. 92 (1912).
181 Mercer v. Meinel, 290 Ill. 395, 125 N.E. 288, 8 A.L.R. 351 (1919). The case
seems to be opposed in theory to Cowen v. Story & Clark Piano Co., note 180
supra, where the court held the landlord liable for his breach of ordinance, although he had leased the entire premises prior to the injury. It would seem more
reasonable to hold that, after the landlord has parted with control of the premises,
the future maintenance of the property in compliance with the act is imposed
upon the tenant or the grantee, unless a public nuisance was created.
182 Klonowski v. Crescent Paper Box Mfg. Co., 217 Ill. App. 150 (1920).
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violation of the act. None of these situations involve the problem of nuisance which was discussed above,8 3 inasmuch as
the duty here discussed is that owed to persons on the premises.
Thus, in summary it should be noted that the landlord's
responsibility for disrepair may arise from his control of
the premises, from a contractual obligation with regard
thereto, from his conduct in concealing the state of disrepair, from his assumption of the duty to repair, from his
creation or maintenance of a nuisance, or by reason of a
legislative enactment. It should also be noted that where
harm results to a tenant from the landlord's breach of duty,
there is no effect upon the tenant's obligation to pay rent,
unless a condition precedent to that obligation can be established or unless a constructive eviction can be proved. And
either the tenant or a third party should, in accordance with
sound theory, be permitted to recover for all harm proximately caused by the landlord's breach of duty. Similar
principles govern the liability of the tenant.
183

See notes 135-158 supra.

